b'480 v ~r^\xc2\xbb \n\nK54 ===============z============= \n\nopy 1 \n\nCotton Claims. \n\n\n\nThe New Act of Congress, \n\nits Benefits and its \n\nLimitations. \n\n\n\nBY \n\nWILLIAM B. KING, \nof the Bar of the Court of Claims. \n\n\n\nWASHINGTON, \n\n1911. \n\n\n\n\n\n\nCopyright, 1911, \n\nby King & King, \n\nNo. 728 P7th Street, \n\nWashington, D< 0. \n\n\n\n\xc2\xa9r,[.A287866 \n\n\n\nCOTTON CLAIMS \n\nBy William B. King \nof the Bar of the Court of Claims. \n\n\n\nNewspaper articles and private letters from all \nover the South show that a large amount of misap- \nprehension exists in the Southern States in regard \nto the scope and effect of the recent provision made \nby Congress for claims for cotton seized at the close \nof the Civil War. The object of this statement is \nto furnish exact information on the subject. \n\nTHE STATUTE. \n\nThis provision forms a part of the general Judicial \nCode, an enactment of 301 sections. Sec. 162 is as \nfollows : \n\n" Sec. 162. That the Court of Claims shall have \njurisdiction to hear and determine the claims of \nthose whose property was taken subsequent to \nJune the first, 1865, under the provisions of the \nAct of Congress approved March twelfth, 1863, \nentitled \'An Act to provide for the collection of \nabandoned property and for the prevention of \nfrauds in insurrectionary districts within the United \nStates,\' and Acts amendatory thereof, where the \nproperty so taken was sold and the net proceeds \nthereof were placed in the Treasury of the United \nStates ; \n\n\' \' and the Secretary of the Treasury shall return \nsaid net proceeds to the owners thereof on the \njudgment of said Court, \n\n"and full jurisdiction is given to said Court \nto adjudge said claims, any statutes of limitation \nto the contrary notwithstanding." \n\nTIME OF TAKING EFFECT. \n\nThe last section of the Judicial Code is as follows : \n\n"Se<\\ 301. This act shall take effect and be in \nforce on and after January first, nineteen hundred \nand twelve." \n\n[i]\' \n\n\n\nA few teat petitions were filed in the Court of \nClaims in March, 1911, in the expectation that the \nDepartment of Justice, which is charged with the \ndefense of cases in the Court of Claims, would raise \nno objection to the preliminary steps being taken \nbefore the first of January, 1912, including the fur- \nnishing of evidence from the archives of the United \nStates Treasury Department and the taking of tes- \ntimony in the Southern States of living witnesses. \nTime is of vital importance, since those who survive \nafter a period of forty-six years must necessarily be \nof advanced years. \n\nThis expectation has been disappointed by an \nabsolute refusal on the part of the officers of the \nDepartment of Justice to allow any steps to be \ntaken under Sec. 162 above quoted until Janu- \nary 1st, 1912. \xe2\x96\xa0 \n\nAn effort is now being made to secure action \nindirectly by filing petitions in the court under the \nTucker Act, but here again the Department of \nJustice is making a vigorous resistance and has \nfiled printed arguments of a hundred and thirty \npages in opposition to such procedure. We have \nalso discussed the subject in an extended brief. The \nquestion was argued on May 1, 1911,- and now \nawaits the decision of the court. \n\nWHAT CLAIMS ARE INCLUDED. \n\nThe right granted under the new law is strictly \nlimited to cotton seized after June 1st, 1865. There \nare many unpaid claims for cotton taken in 1863 \nand 1864, but the present law does not embrace \nany such claims. These stand precisely as they did \nbefore this act was passed. It is possible that these \nmay be considered by the Court of Claims under the \nTucker Act, where net proceeds are to be found in \nthe Treasury. This question has not yet been \nfinally decided. \n\nRECOVERY LIMITED TO NET PROCEEDS. \n\nAt the close of the Civil War the price of cotton \nwas as high as at any time in history. Many claim- \nants from whom cotton was taken have expected \nto recover under this statute the value of the cotton \ntaken. The law does not provide for this. \n\n[2] \n\n\n\nIt provides for payment of only the net proceeds \nin the Treasury. No interest is paid under any con- \nditions. \n\nIt is well known that the agents who were engaged \nto collect this cotton from the plantations were gen- \nerally paid twenty-five percent in kind of whatever \nthey collected. The claimants under the present \nlaw can not recover for this portion of their cotton. \nThe cotton was shipped to the sea coast and then \nusually sent to New York where it was sold. Ex- \npenses piled up at every turn and all these were \ncharged against the cotton, with the result that \nwhen the money reached the Treasury, it repre- \nsented much less than the value of the cotton taken. \nYet this is all that can be recovered. \n\nAs an instance of the diminution of the value of \ncotton on the way to the Treasury by reason of \npayments to agents for collection, accident, and \nexpenses of transportation and sale, it appears in \nthe official report of the Treasury Department that \nin four adjoining counties of one State, 30,010 bales \nof cotton were seized, but the total amount realized \nfrom this was an average of only $61.65 for each \nbale seized. In three other counties 1,810 bales \nwere collected and the total net proceeds to be \ndivided proportionately among these results in an \naverage of only $26.59 a bale. This is unusually \nlow, but it is uncommon to find net proceeds sub- \nstantially in excess of $100 a bale. \n\nNO RECOVERY, IF NO PROCEEDS. ,. \n\nIn a very great number of cases, no money what- \never reached the Treasury. Sometimes the cotton \nwas burned, sometimes it disappeared in transit, \nand its ultimate destination is the subject only of \nspeculation. In other cases, the cotton was sold \nand the money reached the Treasury, but all record \nidentifying the cotton with the owner has been lost. \n\nAn instance which has come to our knowledge is \nthat claims from one county in Alabama amount- \ning to about 700 bales were filed in the Treasury \nDepartment in 1872. The Secretary of the Treasury \nmade a report in 1875 of cotton seized after June 1, \n1865, but not a single bale of cotton is reported to \nhave been collected in that county. These claims \n\n[3] \n\n\n\nmust therefore fail, although undoubtedly the cotton \nwas taken by Federal authorities, unless some record \nnot now available is discovered. \n\nMany receipts have been preserved and are now \nexhibited showing beyond doubt the taking of \ncotton, for which no corresponding proceeds appear \nin this official report. It is probable that some pro- \nceeds will be found upon more detailed investiga- \ntion which were omitted from this report, but these \nmust be exceptions. \n\nThere are some instances where a considerable \namount of cotton is shown to have been taken from \none locality, but the names of the owners are want- \ning. Here it may be possible to prove the total \nquantity taken from that locality and secure a pro \nrata distribution of the proceeds. But many diffi- \nculties lie in the way of such a proceeding. \n\nCongress passed an act in 1872 allowing claimants \nfor cotton taken after June 30, 1865, to present \ntheir claims to the Treasury Department. Claims \nwere presented to the amount of 136,148 bales. The \ntotal number of bales taken after June 1, 1865, \nshown in the report already alluded to, of which the \nnet proceeds reached the Treasury, was slightly in \nexcess of one half this number. Thus, it would \nseem that about one half of the cotton seized was \nnever represented b}\' any net proceeds whatever in \nthe Treasury. \n\nTHE DEFENSE OF CLAIMS. \n\nThis law does not provide for payment of the \nclaims from the Treasury. It merely opens a tri- \nbunal where claims can be adjudicated on their \nmerits. Every claim presented to the Court of \nClaims is a separate lawsuit. The government is \nrepresented before that court by an Assistant Attor- \nney-General, an officer of the Department of Justice, \nand a force of sixteen attorneys, many of whom \nhave long experience in government litigation and \nwho devote their entire attention to defending the \ngovernment against claims there presented. They \nmay be expected to raise ami present every defense \nwhich their intimate knowledge of the subject- \nmatter can suggest, whether technical or upon the \nmerits of the claim. \n\n[4] \n\n\n\nExperience so far in connection with these cases \nindicates that the defense will be conducted with \ngreat activity. Some defenses which will be made \ncan now be anticipated, but it is almost the uni- \nversal experience in the prosecution of government \nclaims before the Court of Claims that many more \ndefenses are ultimately interposed to claims than \ncan possibly be anticipated when the claims are \nfiled, even by the persons most familiar with the \nsubject. \n\nThe great time which has elapsed since these \nclaims originated will make it very difficult to meet \ndefenses based upon record evidence found in the \narchives either of the United States or of the Con- \nfederate government. \n\nCONFEDERATE TITLE. \n\nOne defense which will certainly be vigorously \nurged is that the cotton taken was the property of \nthe Confederate government. This is already offi- \ncially announced. When the Secretary of the \nTreasury was authorized, under an act of Congress \npassed in 1872, to allow claims for cotton taken \nafter June 30, 1805, he allowed $195,896.21 out of a \ntotal claimed, which is estimated on a basis of $100 a \nbale, at $13,614,800.00. This was about one and \na half per cent of the amount claimed. The balance \nwas rejected, chiefly, it is stated in an official cir- \ncular of the Treasury Department, for the reason \nthat the Confederate records show that the claim- \nants had sold the cotton to the Confederate govern- \nment and it was not therefore individual cotton \nwhen seized after June 30, 1865, but was the prop- \nerty of the Confederate government. This statement \nis said to be supported by official records from the \nConfederate Treasury Department, showing that \nmany planters sold cotton to the Confederate govern- \nment and received Confederate bonds in exchange. \nThe Supreme Court of the United States has said of \nthis : \' \' The sale was complete when the bonds were \naccepted in payment. The title then passed to the \nConfederate States without a formal delivery." \n\nIt has been held that title to all property of the \nConfederate government passed to the United States \nat the surrender. \n\n[5] \n\n\n\nIf the cotton for which claim is made was the \nsame cotton thus subscribed to the Confederate \ncotton loan, and if the bonds were delivered, it will \nbe seen that the claim is likely to fail, on the \nground that the cotton belonged to the United States \nwhen seized, unless some reason can be shown \nwhy the decision above quoted should not apply. \nHere is therefore a question of fact to be decided \nin many cases, dependent upon oral testimony. At \nthis late date, it is to be seen that the claimants \nare at a very great disadvantage in being obliged to \nrebut presumptions arising from such records by \nthe scant surviving oral evidence or otherwise. \n\nA. satisfactory explanation can undoubtedly be \nmade in many instances that the cotton on hand in \n1865 was not the same as the subscription cotton, \nor that private cotton was taken instead. It may \nalso be shown that bonds were not issued or not \ndelivered, although the cotton was subscribed and, \nif this omission occurred, title never passed to the \nConfederacy. \n\nThe record evidence of cotton subscription is \ntherefore not conclusive, but presents a serious \ndifficulty which must be met and overcome by the \ncare of the claimant in securing all available wit- \nnesses and the skill of his attorney in bringing out \nthe facts and in arguing the points of law. \n\nLOYALTY. \n\nIt is understood that the claimants for this cotton \nwere, in general, adherents to the Southern cause. \nThe act, Sec. 162, above quoted, revives the earlier \nact of Congress approved March 12, 1803, and gives \na remedy under the provisions of that act. One of \nthe provisions of that act is that payments shall be \nmade to any person applying to the Court of Claims \nupon proving his ownership of the cotton " and \nthat he has never given any aid or comfort to the \npresent rebellion." It is also provided in Sec. 159 \nof the Judicial Code immediately preceding the \nsection quoted in regard to cotton claims " that the \nclaimant, and, where the claim has been Assigned, \nthe original and every prior owner thereof, if a cit- \nizen, has at all times borne true allegiance to the \nGovernment of the United States, and, whether \n\n[6] \n\n\n\na citizen or not, has not in any way voluntarily \naided, abetted, or given encouragement to rebellion \nagainst the said Government." \n\nIt is expressly provided that these statements may \nbe traversed by the Government and that the peti- \ntion shall be dismissed if the decision is against the \nclaimant on this issue. \n\nIt was decided by the Supreme Court of the \nUnited States in the year 1870, under the original \nact of 1863, that a person who had aided the cause \nof the. South could plead under that act that he \nhad been pardoned by one of the proclamations of \nthe President issued in 1865, 1867 and 1868. The \nlast was a proclamation of general amnesty. The \nSupreme Court said of the pardon, " It blots out \nthe offenses and removes all its penal conse- \nquences." It was therefore decided that the plea \nof pardon was equivalent to continuous support of \nthe Union\'s cause throughout the War and that no \nproof of actual loyalty to the United States was \nnecessary in those cotton cases. \n\nWe believe that this -doctrine applies to the act \nof 1911 as well as it did to the act of 1863 and are \nconfident that it will be so decided by the courts \nunder the act of 1911. , Nevertheless itseems highly \nimprobable that so important a point as this will \nbe left unchallenged by the astute counsel for the \nUnited States who defend the Government in such \ncases. It therefore seems likely that the entire \nquestion must be reargued and it may be that, \nbefore any of these claims can be paid, a test case \nmust be appealed to and decided by the Supreme \nCourt of the United States on this point. \n\nTIME OF PAYMENT. \n\nIt may be readily seen after this full statement \nthat claimants can not hope to secure their money \nimmediately. Much delay will necessarily ensue \nuntil the defenses by the United States are all con- \nsidered and decided by the court. Any statements \nthat these claims will be collected within a year \nfrom this date are based either upon ignorance or \ndesign. The experience of a lifetime in the prose- \ncution of government claims makes two things very \ncertain : that payment will be greatly delayed and \n\n[7] \n\n\n\nthat the delays will be far more than can be anti- \ncipated at the present time. \n\nJUDGMENTS BINDING. \n\nWhen all these defenses are met, argued and \ndecided by the courts, judgments will be rendered \nby the Court of Claims in favor of those whose cotton \nwas taken after June 1st, 1865, for the amount of \nthe net proceeds in the Treasury, without regard to \nthe loyalty of the owner, as we believe, but u,pon \nproof that the title was still in the original owner \nand not in the Confederate government. When a \njudgment, is so rendered, if no appeal is taken, it is \nregarded as an absolute binding obligation of the \nUnited States and payment is made by the Gov- \nernment without question. \n\nAPPROPRIATIONS. \n\nSec. 162, if read alone, would seem to make an \nappropriation from the Treasury to pay such judg- \nments, but another law declares that no act of \nCongress shall be construed to make an appropria- \ntion " unless such act shall, in specific terms, \ndeclare an appropriation to be made." Conse- \nquently, even after judgment, some delay must \noccur because no money is available for pay- \nment of such judgment without an appropriation \nfor this purpose by Congress. The delay is only \nuntil the close of the next regular session. \n\nPAYMENT OF JUDGMENTS CERTAIN. \n\nThis law is different from the law under which \nclaims for stores and supplies taken during the Civil \nWar have been considered by the Court of Claims. \nIn these claims, findings of fact are made by the \nCourt of Claims for which Congress may or may not \nappropriate in its discretion, and much delay has \noccurred in making such appropriations. Judg- \nments, such as will be rendered in the cotton claims \nwhere they pass successfully the scrutiny of the \ncourt, are paid by regular annual appropria- \ntions, made at each session of Congress. Claimants \nwho pass through all the difficulties in the Court \nof Claims may therefore be sure of getting their \nmoney. \n\nMay 15, 1911. \n\n[8] \xe2\x80\xa2\'\'\xe2\x80\xa2\'\' \n\n\n\nOne copy del. to Cat. Div. \n\n\n\nmy 24 m, \n\n\n\nLIBRARY OF CONGRESS \n\n\n\nHi III I\'m 1 1. . \n\n013 701 765 9 \n\n\n\n'